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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
K E N N E C O T T C O P P E R CORPORATION, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of Utah,
Defendant and Respondent,
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF
UTAH,
Intervenor and Respondent.

Case No.
7639

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF FACT
The statement of fact is adequately set forth in the
stipulated findings of the lower court. (R2-10) Plaintiff
has set forth most of these findings in its brief, therefore
further elucidation is unnecessary.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The assessments here in question were not made
in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner.
2. The valuation of the lands here in question was
made in accordance with the statutory mandates.
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3. The lands here in question do not come within
that portion of Section 80-5-56, U. C. A., 1943, as
amended, which provides:
"All metalliferous mines and mining claims,
both placer and rock in place, shall be assessed
at $5 per acre and in addition thereto at a value
equal to two times the net annual proceeds thereof for the calendar year next preceding."
ARGUMENT
I.
THE ASSESSMENTS HERE IN QUESTION WERE NOT
MADE IN AN ARBITRARY AND DISCRIMINATORY MANNER.

There is nothing in the record to indicate that plaintiff has been treated in an arbitrary or discriminatory
manner. The fundamental standards followed by the
commission in assessing the lands of the smallest taxpayer within its jurisdiction have been adhered to in
assessing the lands of the Kennecott Copper Corporation. True, the Kennecott Copper Corporation stands
in a unique position because of the magnitude of its operation. Its production and industry can be pointed to with
pride by the people of the state. If the assessments here
in question are wrong, the commission stands ready to
correct them.
Plaintiff stresses the point that lands owned by
others in the vicinity of plaintiff's mill site and tailings
pond are assessed from $4.14 per acre to $66.16 per acre.
(E-12) Certainly there can be no discrimination here be-
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cause plaintiff's lands are now assessed at $45.73 per
acre.
The assessment* of plaintiff's lands were protested
to the commission. The commission considered the matter
and determined that in its opinion $45.73 per acre was
fair. (R-95) Plaintiff attempts to make much of the fact
that the figure of $45.73 per acre is not the personal
valuation of Mr. Higgs, an employee of the property tax
department of the Tax Commission. (R-56) The assessment of lands are made by the Tax Commission. (R23-24)
Plaintiff cannot contend that Commissioner Hammond,
who has been a member of the commission since 1931 and
in charge of ad valorem property taxation, is not at least
as qualified to pass on the validity of an assessment as
one of the commission's employees. (R80-49)
Commissioner Hammond testified that in his opinion
the assessment was fair. (R-95) Mr. Higgs testified that
he reported the lands in question to the commission as a
unit in the entire operation of plaintiff in connection with
net proceeds. (R-57) Plaintiff's statement on page 16
of its brief would leave us to believe that these lands
were reported to the commission to be assessed as "mines
or mining claims," within the meaning of 80-5-56, U. C. A.,
1943, as amended. This is entirely false. Furthermore,
it was stipulated by the parties hereto in the findings of
the lower court (R-8) that:
"The only instance which has come to the attention of the commission wherein a dump is located on other than a mining claim, patented or
unpatented, is the Kennecott Copper Dump as
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outlined on Exhibit A. All other dumps being located on a mining claim, patented or unpatented,
have been assessed at $5.00 per acre. * # *"
In 1947 the legislature changed the assessment of
property from "full cash value" to "40%" thereof. (805-56 U.C.A. 1943, as amended) In order that the court
will understand why the figure of $45.73 per acre remained constant at this time, except for blanket changes,
a portion of the testimony of Commissioner Hammond
is quoted: (E93-94)
"A. During the period of the war, there was
violent fluctuations in values, in market
values, and in the values based on the use to
which land could be put. We called the matter
to the attention of the Legislature, and presented this issue to them. We said land
values and other values are rapidly rising,
and they are rising in erratic ways, in such
a manner that it is very difficult to tell just
what property is truly worth. Some properties are sold at very high values; others not
quite so high, even where the properties were
the same; so there was confusion in values,
in market values along that time. We were
reluctant to move the values up on the basis
of this confused situation, and we presented
the matter to the Legislature. We told them
that there are at least two things involved:
One of them, as to whether they wished
to control levies, or rather control public
expenditures through levies. We explained
that, if we should follow the market on values,
that, in effect, that would take away the
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practical control that was then in operation
through these levy laws, and we suggested
that one or two things—one of two t h i n g s be done; either that the levies be changed so
as to exercise a practical control over a vastlyincreased assessed valuation, or that the law
be enacted which would change the base of
valuation in such a way that these levies still
would be in practical control.
A good deal of discussion was had at that
time. It was thought that property was then
assessed at about forty per cent of its current
value. The Legislature took the course of—
determined that the value should be forty
per cent of what was called its reasonable
fair cash value; so that, for the most part,
values were not changed when this law became
effective, although we had been making
studies which indicated, in some areas, that
the values were certainly less than forty per
cent, and, through a re-assessment procedure,
in a number of counties, the assessments were
changed.
Q. Now, this $45.73 per acre valuation, the Commission went into that matter, they studied
it various times and their determination, after
reasonable study of it, was that the land was
worth $45.73 an acre, is that not correct?
A. Yes, sir, that is correct."
II.
THE VALUATION OF THE LANDS HERE IN QUESTION WAS MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATUTORY MANDATES.

Under the provisions of 80-5-56, U.C.A., 1943, as
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amended, the legislature has provided that property
other than mines or mining claims shall be assessed at
forty per cent of its "reasonable fair cash value."
Section 80-3-1 (5) U.C.A., 1943, provides:
" 'Value' and 'full cash value' mean the
amount at which the property would be taken in
payment of a just debt due from a solvent debtor."
It is general law that these provisions pertaining
to valuation of property are set up as guides or standards by the legislature to aid the taxing body in arriving at a valuation. These factors all resolve themselves
into one element which comprises enumerable factors,
conditions and circumstances and changes, which element
is commonly denominated "market value" See Continental National Bank vs. Naylor, 54 Utah 49, 63, 64; 179
Pac. 67; See also the text State and Local Taxation of
Property by National Industrial Conference Board, Inc.,
1930. At Page 16 it is stated:
"As a general rule, however, the legislatures
have stopped with the definition of taxable value,
frequently modified by the statements that the
value is to be that amount which would be paid
for the property 'by a willing buyer to a willing
seller,' or that amount which would be expected
in the 'settlement of a just debt from a solvent
debtor;' that the value must be that which the
seller would ordinarily receive at a voluntary,
rather than a forced sale; or that the value must
be that obtained in a 'fair, free and well-advertised market.'

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
"A perusal of these statutory provisions leads
to the conclusion that there is nothing unusual or
obscure about the meaning of taxable value. Value
means to the legislator approximately the same
thing that it means to the economist, although
the two define it in different ways. Taxable value
means selling or market value. It does not mean
necessarily the capitalization of income yield or
potential income yield; nor does it mean necessarily the price actually received for any piece
of property at any particular sale. Taxable value
is a norm. It is the price that property might
reasonably be expected to bring in a normal
market * * *"
The plaintiff stresses the fact that the commission
in assessing these properties, took into consideration the
use to which the properties would be subjected. Plaintiff
asserts that if this element is injected into the picture
"the lid is off in that forty per cent of the amount at
which the property would be taken in payment of a just
debt due from a solvent debtor no longer applies." (PL
Brief, 21, 22) No such statement was admitted by defendants or intervenors or byMr. Hammond who testified for
the commission. (R-88) The commission took into consideration this element of use and arrived at the assessed
valuation of $45.73 per acre. It did not arrive at any
"astronomical" figure. As Mr. Hammond testified, the
valuation of the properties in question was a very difficult determination to make, but upon considering the
facts and all the circumstances, the commission arrived
at the value of $45.73 per acre. This difficulty of valuation stresses the very essence of that general doctrine
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in the law which is: that a court shall not substitute its
judgment for that of a taxing body unless it can be determined that fraud or malice was present in making the
assessment.
See Home Fire Insurance Company v. Salt Lake
County, 19 Utah 189, 194, 195, 56 P 681, 682; Also First
National Bank of Nephi v. Christensen, 39 Utah 568, 578,
579,118 P 778, 781.
"In such case, those whose property was intentionally assessed at a higher percentage or
valuation than was placed on the general mass of
taxable properly in the county may invoke the
aid of courts to compel the taxing officers to reduce the excessive assessment so made, to the same
proportion of value as was placed upon the general mass of other taxable property in the county.
A denial of such right results in inequality and a
want of uniformity in the assessment and taxation.
"The burden to show the inequality was on
the plaintiff.
«* * # Of c o u r s e ? specific instances here and
there where a lower valuation in proportion to
the actual or cash value was placed on taxable
property than was placed on plaintiff's property
do not, within themselves, furnish sufficient
ground for complaint. To constitute such ground,
it must be made to appear that a greater valuation in proportion to the actual or cash value was
placed on plaintiff's property than was placed on
the )general mass of taxable property in the
county * * *"
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See also Continental National Bank of Salt Lake
City v. Naylor, 54 Utah 49, 69,179 P 67, 75.
"Even if we could find that there was some
apparent discrimination in point of fact by which
appellant and other banks and their stockholders
were required to pay something more than was required of taxpayers on some other classes of property, still, as we understand the authorities, appellant would have no standing in a court of equity
to restrain the collection of the tax unless the discrimination resulted from wrong principles,
methods, or standards, willfully and intentionally
adopted. Discriminations resulting from mistake,
inadvertence, and miscalculations or error of
judgment must be remedied in some other form of
proceeding than the one adopted by appellant in
the case at bar."
See also Nutter v. Carbon County, 58 Utah 1,11,196
P 1009, 1013; also Pingree National Bank of Og&en, 54
Utah 599,183 P 334.
In order that the court can understand the difficulties in the valuation of land of this type, portions of
the testimony of Commissioner Hammond are inserted.
(E82-83-84-85)
"Q.

Mr. Hammond, I appreciate that I'm trying
to be perhaps too informal on this thing, but
I am trying to do it in the interest of fairness. Now you've had these questions in mind,
and you have discussed the answers, and you
have heard Mr. Collins' answers. Now, if
you disagree, I want to give you full opportunity to state just wherein you disagree and
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A.

Q.
A.

Q.

A.
Q.
A.

the reasons that you might care to give, so
that the Court can be fully informed of the
Tax Commission's position.
I disagree in this particular: Land has value
according to the highest or the best use to
which it can be put. This land, in my opinion,
has had its—
Which land?
The land in the, under the tailings dump, in
my opinion, has had its value, for the purpose for which it was previously used, completely destroyed, at least for all present
considerations, but there has been a value
created there for the purpose to which it is
being, now being put, namely, for a tailings
pond. It is particularly advantageous to the
mining company in question to have land
available close to its operations, and at an
altitude from which, or at an altitude which
makes it easy to get the tailings on to it, so
that I think that the value of this land must
be considered on the basis of the use to which
it can be put in this particular case by Kennecott Copper Company.
Then, you agree with Mr. Collins that, if the
test or basis of assessment is to be forty per
cent of its reasonable fair cash value in the
sense that it would be accepted by a creditor
from a solvent debtor in payment of a debt,
that it would have no, or a nominal value in
that sense?
No, I do not. I would like to explain my position there. Of course, we are getting into
some hypothetical situations—
Oh, yes.
—but consider the land as it is, suppose—and
as it is now being used—suppose that some-
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Q.

A.

Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

one owned that land and could turn the land
over to a person to whom he owed some
money, and that that land is still needed by
Kennecott Copper, I would say that the land
under those conditions has a great deal of
value.
Yes; but, apart from its present use by Kennecott or a successor, do you agree that the
land would not have any value, or at least a
nominal value?
Yes, if Kennecott were abandoned, if there
were no such use for this land, I would say
that its value certainly was questionable, and
might be in a negative sum.
Yes; now, measured by its value to Kennecott
or a successor and its present use, I think,
in your honest opinion, you feel that the figure of $45.73 is the result of the exercise of
an honest judgment, is that correct?
That is correct.
But, by the same token, do you disagree with
Mr. Collins' opinion that you might just as
well have assessed the land on that measure
of value at $4,573 per acre ?
I would disagree with him as far as such an
assessment is concerned.
What would be your standard of value, apart
from a judgment figure, in the sense that
someone pulled out or wrote down $45.73?
In the first place, I'd say that the bottom
price—the bottom value—of this land is its
value as it was prior to the time it was used
for a tailings dump.
That has been destroyed, has it not?
That's true, but that would come into the consideration, for this reason, in the use—in the
other use to which the land is being put,
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surely it would be worth at least as much as
it cost, or it wouldn't be put to this other use.
Q. All right, using that as a starting point, what
else would you do, or did you do ?
A. Then, of course, the problem is if we should
assume that that is the floor, in a considera• tion of this value, the next point would be,
what would be the top value by which the land
could be considered to be worth, and there we
would get into a field of possibly astronomical
figures, but, in the consideration of this, we
certainly did not weigh the value of the land
that might—well, the value that Kennecott
might be compelled to pay in case, in case
the title to the land suddenly were declared
in someone else, and in case they had to buy
the land for their own use. We would not
consider that that top figure would be a sound
basis for valuing the land; in other words,
we wouldn't say that the forced value—the
value that would be forced upon a company
in order to get it would be a sound basis for
value.
Q. That is these astronomical figures ?
A. That is correct.
Q. So, you strike a figure somewhere in between,
is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. And that figure, is it not fair to say, was
purely an arbitrary one that—having to assign a figure somewhere in between those
selected?
A. No, it wasn't an arbitrary one, but it was a
difficult one to figure. It was a difficult one
to reach.
Q. And could it not just as well have been $475
per acre ?
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A. If we had gone that high in the assessed
value, I would say that we were putting a
weight to a figure, a forced figure, that the
company might be required to pay, and I
recognize that a company might be required
to pay a most unreasonable figure, under certain circumstances."
Plaintiff's contention that a taxing body cannot look
to the factor of "use" to which property is put to determine a market value or the assessment of said property
is entirely without merit. As Commissioner Hammond
testified, the use to which land may be put is an important factor in their assessment.
Plaintiff at pages 19, 20 and 21 of its brief sets
forth a portion of the testimony of Mr. Collins, Avhom
plaintiff considers an expert in valuing mines and mining property. However, Mr. Collins specifically testified
that in the course of his work at Tracy-Collins Trust
Company they never made loans on mines or mining
claims, that they did not engage in that type of business
and, therefore, were never called upon to make appraisals
of mines or mining property. (R-78)
In the case of Susquehanna Power Company v. State
Tax Commission of Maryland, 283 U.S. 291, 295, 296,
51 Sup. Ct. 434, 436, 75 L. Ed. 1024, 1046, 1047; this
question concerning the use to which property is put in
determining valuation was discussed by the Court. The
Susquehanna Power Company had purchased large tracts
of land from private individuals, and also had been
granted considerable land by the state to construct a dam
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in a navigable river. This right of construction was
granted by license from the United States Government.
Upon completion of the dam, the lands in the bed of the
Susquehanna Kiver, and in addition the surrounding
lands which had been purchased and granted to the company, were covered by the waters of the dam. The State
Tax Commission of Maryland assessed these lands which
were covered by the waters of the dam at a higher rate
than the surrounding land. The company had objected
upon the grounds that the Tax Commission was taking
into consideration the value of the license granted by the
Federal Government. The court, however, dismissed this
as without merit and held that the taxation of said lands
was constitutional and within the law. The court stated
in the course of its opinion the following:
"No basis is laid in the present record for
assailing the tax on constitutional grounds, either
because the commission has placed a higher value
on appellant's lands than on others having a similar location and use, or because it has directly
taxed appellant's license. The contention urged is
that the lands are assessed at a higher value than
they were before they were submerged, and higher
than farm uplands in the neighborhood, and that
since their use as a part of appellant's power project is rendered possible only by the federal license and by the water in the river, the assessment
at the higher value, in effect, involves a forbidden
tax on the license, and taxation of appellant for
the value of the waters of a navigable stream.
"Accepting as we must on this record, the
valuation of the commission as neither excessive
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nor discriminatory, we can perceive no basis,
either legal or economic, for relieving appellant
from the burden of the tax by attempting the
segregation of a part of that value and attributing
it to independent legal interests, not subject to
taxation, because those interests have a favorable
influence on the value of the property.
"An important element in the value of land is
the use to which it may be put. That many vary
with its location and its relationship to the property or legal interests or others. See Willipiscogee Lake Cotton & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Gilford
64 N.H. 337, 10 Atl. 849. Its proximity to means
of transportation, highways, railroads or tidewater (see State, New York, L. E. & W. R. Co.
Prosecutor, v. Yard, 43 N.J.L. 632; State, Trask,
Prosecutor v. Carragan, 37 N.J.L. 264; cf. Hersey
v. Barron County, 37 Wis. 75) or its location in
the vicinity of water power belonging to another
but available for use upon it (State v. Flavell, 24
N.J.L. 370) may increase its utility and hence its
taxable value. A dock on New York harbor may
have a greater value than one on non-navigable
waters (cf. Leary v. Jersey City 248 U.S. 328, 63
L. Ed. 271, 39 S. Ct. 115, supra; Central R. Co. v.
Jersey City, 209 U.S. 473, 52 L. Ed. 896; 28 S. Ct.
592, supra) even though the advantages of the
former may be terminated through the exercise of
the superior power of the federal government
over navigable waters (see United States v.
Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co. 229 U.S. 53,
57 L . E d . 1063, 33 S. Ct.667)."
"A large part of the value of property in
civilized communities has been built up by its interrelated uses; but it is a value ultimately refleeted in earning capacity and the price at which
the property may be sold, and hence is an element
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to which weight may appropriately be given in
determining its taxable value. It has never been
thought that the taxation of such property at its
enhanced value is in effect taxation of its owner
for the property of others. Nor can we say that
the present tax, based upon what must be taken
to be the fair value of appellant's lands profitable used in the business of developing and selling
power, is forbidden because that use would not
have been possible without the control which appellant has acquired over navigable waters
through the grant of its license. Those considerations which lead to the recognition of the power
of a state to tax the property used by the grantee
in the enjoyment of a federal license require
recognition of the power to tax it on the basis
of accepted standards of value, customarily applied in the taxation of other forms of property.
See Union P. R. Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, 34-37,
21 L. Ed. 787, 792-794, supra.
III.
THE LANDS HERE IN QUESTION DO NOT COME
WITHIN THAT PORTION OF SECTION 80-5-56, U.C.A., 1943,
AS AMENDED WHICH PROVIDES:
"ALL METALLIFEROUS MINES AND MINING
CLAIMS, BOTH PLACER AND ROCK IN PLACE,
SHALL BE ASSESSED AT $5 PER ACRE AND IN
ADDITION THERETO AT A VALUE EQUAL TO
TWO TIMES THE NET ANNUAL PROCEEDS
THEREOF FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR NEXT
PRECEDING."

Plaintiff, in its brief, attempts to bring these lands
within the meaning of this statute by construing them to
be a "part" of plaintiff's mine. The above-quoted provi-
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sion is clear and unambiguous, and the terms referred
to are mines and mining claims, and these properties have
never been reported as a mine or mining claim by plaintiff or its predecessors in interest. (E-8) The most that
can be said is that these properties constitute a "part of
plaintiff's mining operation."
The reason for the enactment of such a statute as
this is to overcome the difficulties in valuing a mine.
Since it cannot be determined, with any degree of certainty, the value of the ore body beneath the surface of
the ground, the legislature had to enact some provision
which would place a reasonable value on that ore body.
The result was this provision embodied in Section 80-5-56,
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which provides a flat $5 per
acre assessment, plus two times the net annual proceeds.
Thus, we see that the reason for this rule of valuation
is a matter of necessity and it, therefore, should not be
extended to include cases clearly not within reason for
the rule.
In other words, if by visual examination of a piece
of property a value can be placed thereon, and there are
no hidden values such as would be found in an ore body
hundreds of feet below the surface of the ground, the
reason for the rule does not exist.
In the case of South Utah Mines and Smelter v.
Beaver County, 262 U. S. 325-332, 43 Su. Ct. 577, 67 L.
Ed. 1004-1008, the court stated:
"The rule prescribed for the valuation of
metalliferous mines, as we have already indicated,
is one of necessity, and should not be extended
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to cases clearly not within the reason of the rule.
The tailings severed and removed from the mine
claims changed in character, placed on other and
separate lands,, and having an adjudicated value
of their own, in our opinion constituted a unit of
property entirely apart from the mine from which
they had been taken. See Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U.S.
762-765, 24 L. Ed. 313-314,14 Mor. Min. Eep. 183.
We think the agreement with the leasing company
was not a sale of these tailings, but that the ownership, pending the process of reduction, remained
in the plaintiff. The plaintiff, therefore, was subject to taxation upon their value, but not as a
mine, since that implies something capable of being mined, which this loose and homogeneous deposit obviously was not"
It can be seen from the opinion in the above-quoted
case that the reason for the rule does not apply in the
present instance, and furthermore, the court, in its opinion, unequivocably states that a tailings dump is not a
mine.
The properties in question have been assessed by
the State Tax Commission, and taxes collected thereon
under that portion of section 80-5-56, U.C.A., 1943, as
amended, which provides:
"All property * * * appurtenant to mines or
mining claims * * * shall be assessed at 40% of
their reasonable fair cash value."
The record shows that these properties have been
assessed by the State Tax Commission and its predecessors, the State Board of Equalization, by authority of
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this provision of the statute, for the 30 years last past.
(R-7) The legislature has amended said provisions of the
law a number of times, the most recent change being
made by the 1949 Legislature, and it has never indicated
its disapproval of the manner in which the Tax Commission has made this assessment, or that the Tax Commission was making the assessment without authority of
law. Upon this basis, it is generally agreed by the authorities in the United States, and by this Court, that the
legislature is presumed to have agreed with said construction, and that it is a clear exposition of the law, as
they intended it. See Utah Hotel Company v. Industrial
Commission, 107 Utah 24,151 P. 2d 467,153 A.L.K. 1176;
Utah Power and Light Co. v. Public Service Commission,
107 Utah 155, 152 Pac. 2d 542; E. C. Olsen Co. v. State
Tax Commission of Utah9 168 Pac. 2d 324; State Board
of Land Commission v. Birie, 56 Utah 213, 190 Pac. 59.
In the case of Salt Lake County v. Kennecott Copper Corporation, 163 Fed. 2d 484, 489, a decision rendered
by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1947, except
for intervenor, the identical parties now before this court
were before the Federal Court. The identical issue of
whether or not the lands upon which plaintiff's tailings
dump and mills are located should be assessed by the
State Tax Commission at $5.00 per acre, plus two times
the net annual proceeds from the mine, or whether said
lands should be assessed as ordinary land, was decided
adversely to plaintiff. The only difference being in the
nature of proof and that in the Federal case the taxes
sought to be recovered were for the year 1944. (R-9-10)
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The Circuit Court upheld the construction which had been
placed upon this provision of the law by the taxing
authority and did so on the basis of an approved administrative construction.
It is the contention of the commission that plaintiff
is bound by this decision and cannot re-litigate this question at this time. That aspect of the doctrine of Kes
Judicata, commonly referred to as Collateral-Estoppel
by judgment is applicable to the present situation.
The United States Supreme Court in the case of
Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 68 S. Ct. 115, 92
L. Ed. 898, gives a very fine exposition of this doctrine.
Under the rule of Res Judicata, when a court, of competent jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the
merits of a cause of action, the parties to the suit are
thereafter bound, not only as to every matter which was
offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or
demand, but also as to any other admissible matter which
might have been offered for that purpose. In a tax
proceeding involving a different cause or demand because of a different tax year in question, this doctrine
of Collateral-Estoppel is applied. It is in this respect
that where a second action between the same parties is
upon a different cause or demand, the judgment in the
prior action operates as an estoppel, not as to matters
which might have been litigated and determined, but
only as to those matters in issue or points controverted
upon the determination of which the finding or verdict
was rendered. (See, Restatement, Judgments §§ 68, 69,
70)
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The plaintiff in attempting to define the term "mine"
so as to bring the properties in question within the meaning of that term, cites from the case of Nephi Plaster
and Manufacturing Co. v. Juab, 33 Utah 113, 93 Pac. 53
(1907). The question in this case is whether a gypsum
deposit, which, being mined, comes within the provisions
of the statute taxing mines and mining claims. The court
held that gypsum is a mineral, and the deposit which was
laid down in the earth, and which was being mined, was
a mine. Certainly, it cannot be claimed that plaintiff's
tailings dump is a mine within the meaning of that term
as used in this case. Plaintiff attempts to effect an extension of that term by citing but a phrase from the
court's opinion. The result is entirely illogical.
Further, plaintiff cites the case of Ontario Silver
Mining Co. v. Hixon, 49 Utah 359, 164 Pac. 498. The
constitutional provision and the law upon which this case
was decided, have since been changed in their entirety.
The particular reference made to that portion of the law
pertaining to property "having a value separate and
independent from such mine or mining claim" is no
longer contained in the law or the Utah Constitution.
Formerly a mine was taxed on the basis paid to the
United States Government for the mine. There is nothing
in the present law which harks back to this principle.
The Supreme Court in the Ontario case, based its decision on that portion of the old law pertaining to whether
or not the property had a separate and independent
value. The court found that the drain tunnels did not
have a separate and independent value from the mine;
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hence, they were not assessable separately from the mine.
There is no analogy between this action and the present
provision of the Utah law. By no stretch of the imagination could such a construction be made. Furthermore,
in the Hixon case, the land at and surrounding the portals
of said tunnels and through which they were constructed
throughout their entire length, consisted of mining
claims and grounds for which the United States has
issued mineral patents as such.
Plaintiff quotes from Justice Wolfe's opinion in the
recent case of Telonis v. Staley, et al, 104 Utah 505, 106
Pac. 2d 163, to further sustain its position. The contention was made in this case that if the surface rights to
property were separately assessed from the underlying
mineral rights, then also under a tax sale, the two estates
should be sold separately. The majority opinion, and
also Justice Wolfe in dissenting, agreed that where the
two estates were owned by one person, then the aggregate of taxes on all interests of the owner could be sold
together, and this would give a valid tax title. That is
what Justice Wolfe's phrase means and it has no bearing on the present question before this court. Plaintiff's
attempt to construe this isolated phase to support its contention that the tailings dump and mill site lands should
be assessed at $5 per acre, plus a multiple of the net proceeds, the same as a mine or mining claim, is without logic
and reason. The meaning of the court is plain and unambiguous, and it does not refer to the point now in
litigation.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has failed to show that the assessments here
in question were made in an arbitrary or discriminatory
manner. Further, the statutory requirements in assessing the lands in question have been adhered to without
question. Plaintiff's last proposition that the mill site
lands and tailings pond lands should be assessed at $5
an acre, etc., because they are "a part of the mine" disregards the express and unambiguous language of the
statute.
This court has recently passed upon a question involving the use of these words in the case of Crystal Lime
and Cement Co. v. Bobbins, et al,
Ut
, 209 Pac.
2d 739. It is unnecessary to quote portions of that opinion, however, it is clear that the term "mine and mining
claims" could never be construed to include land or
property which may be "a part of the mine."
The judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANK E. MOSS,
County Attorney
WILLIAM T. THURMAN,
Chief Beauty, Civil
Attorneys for Defendant,
LELAND S. McCULLOUGH,
C. M. GILMOUR,
DON J. HANSON,
Attorneys for Intervenor
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